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The field of strategy has mounted an enormous effort to understand, define, predict, and measure 
how organizational capabilities shape competitive advantage. While the notion that capabilities 
influence strategy dates back to the work of Andrews (1971), attempts to formalize a “capabilities 
based” approach to strategy only began to take shape in the past twenty years. In particular, the 
publication of Teece and Pisano (1994) and Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) work on “dynamic 
capabilities” triggered a flood of debate and discussion on the topic. Because strategy is a 
normative field, its theories must be evaluated in terms of how well they inform and impact 
practice.  Judging by this standard, the dynamic research capabilities research program has 
come up short. It has become mired in endless debates about definitions and has engaged 
obsessively in an elusive search for properties that make organizations adaptable.  In this paper, I 
argue that the research program on dynamic capabilities needs to be reset around the 
fundamental strategic problem facing firms:  how to identify and select capabilities that lead to 
competitive advantage.   I frame the firm’s capability strategy problem as one of choosing among 
different types of capability enhancing investments, ranging from general-purpose know-how to 
application-specific know-how. The framework also draws a distinction between investments 
designed to deepen the firm’s existing base of capabilities and those designed to broaden its 
repertoire into new realms. I explore the applicability of this framework to three general types of 
competitive circumstances: stable product market competition, Schumpeterian entry, and 
Penrosian dynamics.  A major goal of the paper is to identify important gaps in our theoretical and 
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 I. Introduction 
The field of strategy has mounted an enormous effort to understand, define, predict, and 
measure how organizational capabilities shape competitive advantage. While the notion that 
capabilities influence strategy dates back to the work of Andrews (1971)1, attempts to formalize a 
“capabilities based” approach to strategy only began to take shape in the past twenty years. In 
particular, the publication of Teece and Pisano (1994) and Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) 
work on “dynamic capabilities” triggered a flood of debate and discussion on the topic.2 Despite 
such a concerted intellectual effort, progress toward a strategic theory of capabilities or even a 
coherent framework has been disappointing. For instance, in a comprehensive review of the 
literature on the topic, Peteraf et al. (2013) put in starkly: “From the intensity of this research effort 
and evident interest in the topic, one might surmise that there exists a common understanding of 
dynamic capabilities. This is far from the case. The construct remains open to a variety of 
conceptualizations and interpretations concerning even its most basic aspects, including how 
dynamic capabilities are defined.” The attempt to parse the dynamic capabilities concept at ever-
finer levels of detail has lead to multiple competing definitions (for a comparison, see Dosi et al. 
2008). Even the most ardent supporters of a dynamic capabilities approach to strategy would 
have to admit that the framework has made little progress theoretically, and has certainly gained 
																																																								
1 Other early antecedents include Hayes (1985), Winter (1987), and Prahalad and Hamel (1990) 
2 According to a recent review by Peteraf et al. (2013), since 2006 alone, articles on “dynamic capabilities” have appeared 
in management journals at a rate of more than 100 per year.	
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even less traction among practitioners. 
 
Perhaps this lack of convergence should not be surprising. Both capabilities and strategy 
are broad realms, lending themselves to a range of perspectives. Debate may simply reflect a 
healthy process of generation and selection among multiple competing ideas, especially early in 
the intellectual life cycle of a concept (Helfat and Peteraf 2009). In this essay, I want to suggest a 
deeper underlying problem: the debate has become obsessed with the wrong questions. 
Specifically, the vast majority of literature on dynamic capabilities has focused on questions 
related to definitions: What exactly is a dynamic capability? How is such a capability different from 
other capabilities? What are the organizational determinants of such “dynamic capabilities” 
(whatever they may be)? The search for an elusive set of “dynamic capabilities” has become the 
holy grail of the literature. Clear definitions, of course, are important, but definitions are tools, and 
tools are only useful when they are designed to solve a specific problem. A terminology debate 
about a theory without a clear understanding of the problem the theory is trying to solve is 
unproductive. Lost in the froth of academic debate on terminology has been the very basic 
problems a capabilities-based approach to strategy should be seeking to solve.  
 
In this paper, I argue that rather than chasing after an elusive property of enterprises 
called “dynamic capabilities”, we should instead focus on the problem of how competition in 
product markets and competition to create capabilities are linked. I start with the (original) 
premise of dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano 1994, and Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997) 
that capability identification, selection, and creation is an important (practical) strategic decision—
just as important to competitive performance as decisions about which markets to enter, how to 
position, in which markets to exploit existing resource position, how to deter entry, pricing, and 
other “traditional” strategic variables. Just as firms compete in product markets, they also 
compete to create technological, operational, and organizational capabilities that provide them 
advantage in those product markets. Decisions about product market entry and position, and 
decisions about capability creation are intimately linked. Investments in capabilities create 
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strategic options for competition in product markets. The job of a capabilities-based theory of 
strategy should be to provide conceptual and practical insights about these links. More 
specifically, a capability-based theory of strategy should identify the choices available to firms and 
the consequences of those choices under different competitive circumstances.  
 
I frame the firm’s capability strategy problem as one of choosing among investments in 
different types of capabilities. Throughout, I will keep my definition of capabilities fairly basic.  
Following Winter (2003), a capability is a collection of organizational routines that enable a firm to 
perform some set of tasks on a repeatable or consistent basis. The term know-how and 
capabilities will be used interchangeability. At any point in time, a firm possesses a repertoire of 
capabilities that span a continuum from highly general-purpose (e.g. mechanical engineering, 
organic chemistry, assembly manufacturing, quality improvement, financial management, etc.) to 
highly application-specific (compact car design, immunotherapeutic cancer drug discovery, 
retail banking in a particular region, high-volume semiconductor manufacturing, etc.). The firm’s 
capability strategy involves choices between deepening their existing capabilities versus 
broadening their repertoire to include new sets of capabilities. Obviously, firms can do both, but 
resource constraints mean that it must make choices at the margin. In addition, a firm’s capability 
choices are partially constrained—they are neither complete prisoners of their past nor can they 
change instantly and infinitely. A robust capability-based theory of strategy should provide 
guidance to managers about the nature of these constraints (e.g. which choices are economically 
feasible?) and the implications of their capability decisions across a broad range of competitive 
circumstances.  
 
For purposes of illustration, the paper examines capability strategy choices in three fairly 
common types of competitive configurations that vary in both the structure of supply (who are the 
competitors) and demand (who are the customers):  1) Stable Product Market Competition: 
competing against existing rivals in existing markets (e.g. Honda vs. Toyota in the automobile 
market) 2) Schumpeterian Entry: competing against new entrants in an existing market (e.g. 
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Honda vs. Tesla in automobiles) 3) Penrosian Dynamics: competing against new rivals as a 
result of diversifying into new markets (e.g. Honda’s entry into light jets). By including 
consideration of “stable product markets”, this paper departs from the existing dynamic 
capabilities literature that has largely concerned itself with so-called “turbulent” environments. As 
discussed later, firms in a broad range of environments (including some seemingly stable ones 
like automobiles) compete vigorously in the creation of new capabilities. A capability-based theory 
of strategy should be able to address capability-based competition in the full range of competitive 
circumstances a firm may face.   
 
I close the essay by evaluating our state of theoretical and empirical knowledge in each 
of these three circumstances, and suggest important gaps in our understanding that should be 
tackled in future research. 
 
II. Focal Questions For a Capabilities-Based Theory of Strategy 
Theory development is one of identifying and filling gaps between causal explanations 
and observed phenomenon (Kuhn 1970). A capabilities-based theory of strategy, like any theory, 
needs to start with the gap between what we can see and what we can explain. Strategic theory 
is, by and large, a normative endeavor. For a normative field, like strategy, the search for new 
theory begins when existing theories cannot explain or predict better outcomes, and thus fail to 
provide practical guidance. Such gaps suggest new questions, and these should become focal 
points for empirical exploration and theory development.  
 
The strategy field has been undergoing this “gap filling” process for more than five 
decades.  The field of business strategy emerged in the 1960s to address the question: what can 
companies do to gain advantage over their competitors? But underneath this normative question 
lied a theoretical question (at least implicitly): why are some firms more successful (long term 
profitability, growth, etc.) than others? This question was based on the observation (both casual 
and later statistical) that some firms were more profitable than others. This phenomenon also 
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presented an interesting puzzle when viewed against traditional economic theory in the pre-1950 
period. Under standard economic theory, barring monopoly or collusive oligopoly, competitive 
forces drive an equilibration between supply and demand, and above normal profits disappear. 
Firms capturing rents over anything but a transitory period are anomalies. Unfortunately (for 
standard economic theory) there were too many anomalies to be ignored, and the search began 
for theories that might explain sustained “excess” rents. 
 
Research to tackle this problem was initiated by Edward Mason and Joe Bain in the 
1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. They, and later their followers such as Nicholls, Markham, Peck, and 
Caves, conducted a series of industry case studies exploring the structural factors (e.g. entry 
barriers) that influenced the behavior of firms (e.g. pricing) and the overall performance of the 
industry.  These empirical and theoretical works created the “structure-conduct-performance” 
paradigm of industrial organization and a body of underlying theories connecting various industry 
structure parameters to firm level behavioral variables (strategy) and economic performance. 
Utilizing the structure-conduct-performance paradigm as his base, Michael Porter (1980) 
developed a useful framework for strategy. As is well known today, Porter’s “five forces” 
framework posited that firms can gain an advantage by selecting strategies that exploit underlying 
structural conditions of an industry (e.g. entry barriers, the potential for product differentiation). In 
Porter’s framework, the central questions of strategy are: which industries should we enter and 
how should we position ourselves within those industries? Analytically, these questions are 
tackled by identifying industry features such as entry barriers and other forces that impede the 
equilibration of markets.  
 
As a framework, “five forces” has been remarkably successful. It is logically consistent. It 
can explain the facts well (for instance, why are airlines, on average, much less profitable than 
pharmaceutical companies). It has held up well to empirical testing. It is flexible enough to handle 
a broad range of strategic contexts and problems. And it could be distilled into useful analytical 
tools and concepts to help practitioners make sense of the world. While subsequent work in 
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economics, particularly game theory, expanded these notions and incorporated more 
sophisticated firm-to-firm interactions, and probed more deeply into specific strategic contexts 
(e.g. capacity strategies, entry deterrence), the basic edifice has been robust.   
 
But there was a puzzle that Porter’s and subsequent economic approaches could not 
explain:  namely, the relatively high degree of intra-industry variability in profitability over long 
periods.  Empirical studies (Lippman and Rumelt 1982, Rumelt 1984, Rumelt 1991) and 
numerous case studies suggested there was more to the picture than just picking the right 
industry or getting the positioning right.  Many companies within the same industry following 
similar strategies had very different performance (consider discount airlines, brewers, 
semiconductor companies, car companies). Moreover, case studies and later empirical studies 
suggested that rivals in an industry were generally far from homogenous when it came to 
capabilities and resources. These observations lead to the development of resource-based 
theories of strategy (Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991, Amit and Schoemaker 1993). 
 
Following Penrose (1959), resource based theorists adopted the idea that firms could be 
viewed as collections of resources. The resource-based theory of strategy sought to explain intra-
industry performance differences with firm-specific (non-imitable) “resources”: tangible and 
intangible assets like skills, capabilities, reputation, brand equity, etc. Given the theory’s 
intellectual connection to Penrose, it is perhaps not surprising that resource-based theory made 
its most precise predictions on the matter of corporate diversification (e.g. Teece 1982, 
Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988). 
 
Resource-base theory does a good job explaining phenomena like why some types of 
corporate diversification strategies work better than others. It also provides a relatively coherent 
explanation for intra-industry differences in advantage. Resource-based theory, by and large, 
takes the resource endowments of firms as given. There were differences across firms, yes, but 
these were either largely outside the realm of the analysis, or just assumed to be a matter of 
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history (see e.g. Barney 1986).   
 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a series of studies largely undertaken by scholars 
outside the strategy field were creating another puzzle. Statistical and case studies of product 
development and operational performance (Abernathy et al. 1983; Garvin 1988: Hayes and Clark 
1986: Clark and Fujimoto 1990: Pisano 1994: Iansiti 1994) suggested that some organizations do 
a better job creating and developing those capabilities that lead to sustained competitive 
advantage. Moreover, this line of work indicated that some firms were more capable of renewing 
their skills and building new competences. Resources (broadly defined) were not static.  
 
Like Porter’s five forces framework, resource-based theories had little to say about the 
dynamics of capability-creation. It could not explain why, for instance, Toyota had accumulated 
stronger capabilities in product development and manufacturing than General Motors. It could not 
predict whether a firm like Intel would maintain its lead in technology over a rival like AMD, even 
though such a capability advantage may be critical to Intel’s competitive advantage in the 
microprocessor market. And resource-based theory provides little guidance to firms about the 
kind of capabilities they might attempt to develop in order to secure or sustain a competitive 
advantage (beyond general properties like inimitability and uniqueness). Such dynamics of 
capability accumulation were completely outside the realm of either Porter or resource-based 
frameworks.  
 
Moreover, neither framework even identified capability creation as a question of strategic 
significance to the practitioner. A practitioner reading Porter would immediately recognize that it 
was critical for them to consider the questions: “What industries/product markets should we enter 
and how should we position ourselves in these?”  The prescient strategy question is essentially 
identical in resource-based theories: what industries/product markets to enter and how to position 
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the firm within those.3 A capabilities-based perspective asks practitioners to consider a different 
question: what capabilities should the firm nurture to gain a competitive advantage?   
 
The Dynamic Capabilities Framework 
Responding to this gap, Teece and Pisano (1994) and Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) outlined 
a framework—generally referred to as “dynamic capabilities”--for understanding firm level 
capability differences. The “dynamic capabilities” framework conjectured that firm-level 
differences in capabilities were rooted in three factors: 
1. Asset Positions: Following evolutionary economic and path-dependence logic, a firm’s 
ability to change their future repertoire of capabilities is constrained by its current stock of 
capabilities.  Teece and Pisano (1994) used the term “assets” broadly to define the 
legacy resources (knowledge, technical skills, organizational competences, etc.) that 
shaped the firm’s options for future capability expansion.  
2. Processes:  Firms can “reconfigure” their asset positions by investments and other 
managerial interventions.  But a firm’s capacity to reconfigure is not unlimited. It depends 
on a set of ‘higher-order’ routines (like governance structures, resource allocation 
processes, management systems, etc.) that shape organizational adaptability.  It is this 
capacity to reconfigure a firm’s asset positions and specifically the “processes” that 
underlie this capacity that Teece and Pisano (1994) called its “dynamic capabilities.”   
3. Paths: Because most capabilities are cumulative and develop over time through a series 
of coordinated investments, they involve commitments to “paths”, rather than discrete 
projects.  A key strategic problem for firms is to identify and commit to paths for capability 
creation that lead to competitive advantage. Managerial discretion in the selection of 
paths—along with constraints imposed by pre-existing asset positions and processes for 
																																																								
3 The fundamental difference between the two frameworks is the underlying factors that should influence the answer (in 
Porter, structural characteristics of industry take center stage; in resource-based frameworks, consideration is given to the 
firm’s unique resources). 
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reconfiguration--can lead to differences in firm capabilities.   
 
The dynamic capabilities framework had both descriptive and normative implications. It could be 
use to help explain firm-level differences.  But, it also aspired to inform managers about how to 
make better capability decisions. The dynamic capabilities framework argued that these kinds of 
choices were important to a firm’s competitive advantage, and thus should be a focal point for 
strategic analysis.  The third leg of the framework—choices about paths—was the most explicitly 
normative, but the original formulations in Teece and Pisano (1994) and Teece, Pisano, and 
Shuen (1997) offered only high-level normative guidance.  It was hoped at the time that future 
research would illuminate many more details and principles about how managers should make 
capability investment commitments.   
Unfortunately, this is not the issue that became the focal point of “dynamic capabilities” 
literature.4 That literature has come to focus on the question of why some firms are more 
adaptable than others. Specifically, the literature has been consumed with the second leg of the 
framework---identifying and specifying exactly what “dynamic capabilities” are and how they 
contribute to a firm’s capacity to adapt to change and reconfigure their competences and assets. 
This is important work, and has lead to interesting insights about organizational change.  But 
such a capacity for change alone tells us nothing about competitive outcomes, other than the 
obvious fact that a more flexible firm will likely do better in a more uncertain environment. As 
Winter (2003, page 994) points out: “Some of the mystery and confusion surrounding the concept 
of dynamic capabilities arises from linking the concept too tightly to notions of generalized 
effectiveness at dealing with change and generic formulas for sustainable competitive 
advantage.”   
 
Telling managers they should create organizations that are adaptable is fine and 
developing good theories about what makes a firm adaptable is certainly a worthwhile endeavor.  
																																																								
4 For excellent reviews, see Dosi (2008), Helfat and Peteraf (2009), and Peteraf et al. (2013) 
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However, understanding the merits and drivers of organizational adaptability does not constitute 
the basis of a helpful theory of strategy. “How do I make my enterprise more adaptable?” is a very 
different question than “What capabilities should I attempt to create to gain a competitive 
advantage?”  The former is not a strategy question, the latter is.   
 
III. Dynamics of Capability Accumulation 
A critical premise of a capabilities-based approach to strategy is that capabilities not only 
vary across firms, but these differences are the result of management choices. If capabilities do 
not vary across firms, or if such capability differences have nothing to do with management 
discretion, the prescient strategic question (“Which capabilities should we seek to create to gain 
an advantage?”) is moot. What does the empirical evidence say?  
 
As noted earlier, we have ample evidence that capabilities (of all stripes) vary 
significantly across firms even after controlling for a broad array of factors (like product mix, 
industry, capital stock, etc.) Historians like Chandler documented dramatic differences across 
firms in terms of administrative, operational, and distribution capabilities (Chandler 1990).  
Detailed empirical analyses of productivity show productivity differs significantly across firms (see 
e.g. Hayes and Clark 1986, Bloom and van Reenen 2007). We have ample empirical evidence 
from a variety of industries that quality differences (e.g. defect rates, yields) vary dramatically 
across firms within the same industry (e.g. Garvin 1988, Womack et al 1990). We know that 
operational flexibility varies significantly across firms (see Upton 1995). We know that product 
and process development capabilities (measured in terms of speed, engineering productivity, and 
development quality) vary significantly across firms (Clark and Fujimoto 1990, Pisano 1996, 
Iansiti 1998, Henderson and Cockburn 1994). We also know from numerous studies that sudden 
upheavals in an industry’s underlying technology base can create large and persistent differences 
in technological capabilities across competitors (Dosi 1984, Malerba 1985, Abernathy and Clark 
1985, Tushman and Anderson 1986, Henderson and Clark 1990, Christensen 1997).  
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However, differences in capability are not enough to motivate the need for a capabilities-
based theory of strategy.  Two null hypotheses must first be evaluated.  First, are these 
differences random?  If random, then they are beyond management control (and thus, outside the 
realm of strategy). Second, are these differences purely a function of firm history (path 
dependence)? If this is true, then capabilities of a firm are once again beyond management 
control (and, again, outside the realm of strategy). For capabilities to be a “strategic variable”, 
management must be able to influence their creation and evolution. They must be endogenously 
shaped by management decisions. If capability creation is either a purely random or completely 
determined process, then the third leg of the original “dynamic capabilities” framework is 
normatively irrelevant. Existing theories (such as resource-based theories) already help us 
understand how extant capabilities may be deployed for competitive advantage. 
 
Randomness: Can We Rule Out Luck? 
In an influential paper, Jay Barney (1986) argued that resource endowments of firms 
were a function of luck. That being the case, the paper asserted, the task of strategic 
management is to understand how best to exploit the firm’s given endowments, rather than to 
manipulate those. If resources (including capabilities) are the outcome of a “dice-roll”, then it 
makes little sense to focus on how to roll the dice; better to focus attention on what to do given 
that roll.  Barney’s argument is provocative. However, the vast majority of empirical and case-
based evidence strongly contradicts it. Over the past three decades, a number of empirical 
investigations and case study research has been done to understand firm-level differences in 
productivity, quality, manufacturing flexibility, and product and process development. While a full-
blown review of these findings is beyond the scope of this paper, a number of key streams of 
work are highlighted below. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, a steady stream of empirical work has demonstrated clearly that 
there are significant differences in total factor productivity across firms and that these differences 
are systematically related to differences in management practice. Hayes and Clark (1985) 
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conducted the first study in this vein. Using factory level data on total factor productivity across a 
small sample of firms, they identified differences in management practice as a significant driver of 
differences in productivity. More recently, analyzing survey data collected from 5850 firms across 
seventeen countries, Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) come to essentially the same conclusion as 
Hayes and Clark: “The patterns within our large sample of management data across firms and 
countries have led us to believe that one important explanation for the large differences in 
productivity between firms and countries—differences that cannot be readily explained by other 
factors—is variations in management practices.”5 Similar results can be found for the research 
that has investigated inter-firm differences in quality (e.g. Garvin 1988, Womack et al. 1991) and 
manufacturing flexibility (Upton 1995).    
 
An extensive body of research has also documented the role that differences in 
management practice play in R&D capabilities.  In a study of the global automobile industry, Clark 
and Fujimoto (1990) found that significant differences in product development lead times, 
engineering productivity, and development quality could be traced to specific management 
practices. The role of management in shaping product and process development capability can 
be found in numerous other studies, including Iansiti’s (1998) work on semiconductors and 
computers (1997), Pisano’s work (1996) on pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, and Henderson 
and Cockburn’s (1994) work on R&D productivity in pharmaceuticals.   
 
The mass of available empirical evidence on the drivers of such critical operating 
capabilities behind productivity, quality, manufacturing flexibility, and R&D performance clearly 
indicates that “management matters.” The notion that firm capabilities are somehow randomly 
distributed among firms is simply not tenable given the available empirical evidence.  
 
Path Dependence: Can We Rule Out Determinism? 
The concept of “path dependence”—meaning what happens today is a function of what 
																																																								
5 Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) page 222.  
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happened yesterday—has featured prominently in capabilities-based discussions of strategy (and 
as noted above, was a key pillar of the original “dynamic capabilities” framework). The general 
idea is that a firm’s capabilities today are constrained by the capabilities it has accumulated in the 
past.  This view is strongly rooted in ecological and evolutionary theories of the firm (see e.g. 
Hannan and Freeman 1977, Nelson and Winter 1982) that posit that strong inertial forces 
severely constrain organizations’ capacity to adapt to environmental changes.  Taken to its 
extreme, path dependence once again calls into question management’s ability to shape 
capabilities. Some researchers have even gone as far as to call the strategic managers job “futile 
in the face of environmental disruptions” (Drew, Goldfarb, and Sarasvathy 2006). If the visible 
hand of management cannot shape an organization’s capabilities, one just needs to understand 
starting positions and the rest is “set in stone.”   
 
The empirical evidence, however, casts serious doubt on strong-form path dependence 
arguments. Several studies have noted that the capacity for learning and adaptation varies 
dramatically across organizations, and these differences—once again—appear to be rooted in 
management actions, policies, and decisions (see. e.g. Bloom and van Reenen 2010). While a 
number of studies highlight the challenges industry incumbents face adapting their capabilities to 
dramatic technological changes (e.g. Tushman and Anderson 1984, Henderson and Clark 1990, 
Christensen 1997), failure to adapt is not inevitable. Henderson and Clark (1990), for instance, 
found organizations that successfully adapted to major “architectural” transitions in the 
photolithography business.  Work by King and Tucci (2002) in the disk drive industry shows that 
an incumbent’s experience in a previous market actually increased their probability of entering a 
new market. Others who have documented instances of organizational adaptation include Tripsas 
(1997), and O’Reilly and Tushman (2008). In summarizing the arguments for the adaptability of 
firms, O’Reilly and Tushman (2008, page 5) conclude:  
For every well-known failure (e.g., Polaroid and Pan Am), there are firms like GKN, a 245 
year-old maker of auto parts and aero-space materials, that began as a coal mining 
company, or the Harris Corporation, a 100 year-old high tech electronics firm that began 
manufacturing presses. B.F. Goodrich, for example, was founded in 1870 as a 
manufacturer of fire hoses and conveyor belts for manufacturing. Today, they are an 
aerospace company. The Tandy Corporation, founded in 1898, was originally a maker of 
	 15
leather goods and is today a retailer of electronic products. Bally began making pinball 
machines and now is a large operator of gambling casinos and fitness centers. 
Famously, IBM began as a maker of mechanical office equipment and today is primarily a 
service and consulting company.   
 
Strategic Capabilities As Quasi-Fungible 
The body of evidence, when taken in its entirety, suggests that managerial discretion can 
shape an organization’s capabilities, but such discretion is by no means unlimited. Creating new 
capabilities is costly, time consuming, hard to fully predict and ultimately bounded. An 
organization like IBM may, over decades, evolve from a maker of mechanical office equipment to 
a computer company to an IT services and consulting company, but it is unlikely that IBM could 
have gone from being a computer company to an aerospace company or drug company 
overnight. Capability creation occupies a “middle zone” between the two extremes of, on the one 
hand, complete, unbounded fungibility (as seen through traditional economic theory lens) and, on 
the other hand, complete, history-determined inertia (as seen through a strong path-dependence 
lens). The fact that capabilities live in this “middle zone” is exactly what makes them strategic. If 
capabilities could be changed instantly and without cost, they could never confer an advantage. 
Rivals could quickly imitate advantageous capabilities, thus dissipating associated rents. On the 
other hand, if capabilities were a complete “straightjacket,” then they would no longer be a 
strategic variable, and thus outside the realm of strategic analysis.  
 
IV. Characterizing A Firm’s Capability Strategy   
A capability-based perspective on strategy views competition as occurring at two levels.  
One is the visible level of product market competition. This level concerns familiar decisions like 
entry strategies, positioning and deterrence. This level is relatively “visible” because most 
strategic product market moves of firms are somewhat observable using public data sources 
(annual reports, press releases, market price data, etc.). It concerns such familiar strategy 
questions as “What kind of next generation aircraft should Boeing develop to gain an advantage 
over Airbus?”; “How should Apple position the Apple Watch relative to Samsung’s watch-like 
device?”; “Should Honda enter the market for light private jets?”; and “What kind of alliances 
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might Netflix form with internet service providers to gain an advantage over rivals in the video-on-
demand market?” The other level of competition—much less visible to outsiders—concerns the 
competition to create operational, organizational, and technological capabilities. Here, we get into 
the “guts” of how organizations do things. This level of competition concerns such questions as:  
“How much should Apple invest in developing novel battery technologies?”; “How heavily should 
BMW be investing in hydrogen fuel cell technology (vs. alternatives)?”; “How much should Boeing 
be investing in 3D manufacturing processes?” and “Should Amazon be investing heavily in the 
software required to make drone delivery safe and reliable?”  These capabilities result from a host 
of activities such as formal R&D programs, experimentation, autonomous learning, training, 
human resource initiatives, process re-engineering improvement, and the like. Scholars and 
practitioners have historically viewed these kinds of “engineering” and “operating” decisions as 
outside the realm of strategy. A capabilities-based view of strategy says that if these decisions 
change the terms of competitive advantage, they are, in fact, quite central to strategy.     
 
A capabilities-based theory of strategy should link product level competition and 
capability-level competition. It should help us understand how the dynamics of product market 
competition may influence the capability strategies pursued by different rivals, and conversely, it 
should help us understand how rivals’ “bets” on different capability strategies could influence 
product market competition. Normatively, it should help managers identify which types of 
capability improvement trajectories are likely to provide an advantage.  
 
The Strategic Choice Set 
Strategy is always and everywhere about irreversible choices and trade-offs.6 Choice is 
the focal point of strategic analysis. A robust strategy theory must be clear about the set of 
choices that fall under its analytical umbrella. Porter’s competitive forces framework (1980), for 
instance, was quite clear that a firm’s strategy consisted of choices about which markets to enter 
and whether to position as a “low cost” or “differentiated” player in those markets. Game theoretic 
																																																								
6 See for instance Ghemawat (1991) and Porter (1991) 
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models of strategy have been equally crisp in spelling out specific strategy choices faces by firms 
(e.g. to add capacity ahead of competitors or to wait). Resource-based theories focus on choices 
about market entry and positioning. 
 
What is the firm’s strategic choice from a capabilities perspective? Dierickx and Cool 
(1989) provide early insight into this question:  “[A] key dimension of strategy formulation may be 
identified as the task of making appropriate choices about strategic expenditures (advertising 
spending, R&D outlays, etc.) with a view to accumulating resources and skills (brand loyalty, 
technological expertise, etc.). Teece and Pisano (1994) similarly offered that a firm’s strategic 
problem was to choose among alternative investment paths for building capabilities that would 
underlie competitive advantage. However, since that time there has been relatively little progress 
in characterizing the specific capability investment choices faced by firms. As noted earlier, the 
vast chunk of work on dynamic capabilities has not focused on choices, but rather on adaptability.  
This has impeded progress on a strategic theory of capabilities.  
 
At any point in time, a firm possesses a repertoire of capabilities that span a continuum 
from general-purpose (e.g. mechanical engineering, organic chemistry, assembly manufacturing, 
quality improvement, financial management, etc.) to highly application-specific (compact car 
design, immunotherapeutic cancer drug discovery, semiconductor manufacturing, etc.). The firm’s 
capability strategy problem involves choices about investments that either deepen their existing 
capabilities or broaden their repertoire to include new sets of capabilities.   
 
General Purpose Know-How vs. Application-Specific Know-How 
Following Winter’s (2003) definition, a capability is a collection of organizational routines 
that enable a firm to perform some set of tasks on a repeatable or consistent basis. The span of 
tasks that can be performed depends on the nature of the underlying knowledge. At one extreme, 
we can think of “general-purpose know-how” which can be deployed in a relatively broad range of 
uses. For instance, auto companies deploy a lot of mechanical engineering know-how in the 
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design and manufacture of vehicles, but mechanical engineering is by no means unique to cars—
it is used in the design of motorcycles, airplanes, medical devices, toys, furniture, and consumer 
electronics to name just a few. But it takes more than raw mechanical engineering know-how to 
design a competitive car. Car design also requires the application of idiosyncratic knowledge 
specific to vehicles (and unique to a company’s rendition of a specific vehicle). This type of 
knowledge is referred to as application-specific knowledge.7  For instance, designing a car 
chassis requires solving a host of specific engineering problems associated with the unique 
requirements and uses of a car (e.g. the chassis is stressed at different points depending on the 
weight of the vehicle, the conditions of the road, the speed of the vehicle, the RPM of the engine, 
whether the vehicle is turning, breaking, or accelerating, etc.). And knowledge about how to 
design a chassis for a BMW 3-series is not exactly the same as what is required to design a 
chassis for a full-sized Ford pick-up truck. That same knowledge about chassis design for a car, 
however, does not necessarily transfer to the design of a motorcycle (where a key challenge 
involves figuring out the weight distribution to ensure stability of 2-wheeled vehicle).   
 
Application-specificity is a matter of degree, not kind. For instance, designing cars and 
airplanes share more in common than designing cars and discovering cancer drugs. But 
designing a car has unique aspects relative to designing airplanes. And within the broad realm of 
cars, there are significant differences in skill sets required. Designing a $15,000 Kia Soul is a 
fundamentally different engineering task than designing a $300,000 Ferrari F12Berlinetta (which 
might have more in common with designing a small airplane). Application-specificity comes down 
to the degree to which knowledge is transferable across tasks or contexts (e.g. product 
categories, market segments, operating constraints, and geography). Differences in tasks and 
context may be quite subtle. For instance, Walmart knows how to effectively operate large, low 
cost supermarkets throughout the US—but that same capability does not seem to have 
transferred well to many markets outside the US (e.g. Germany). While the differences between 
general purpose and application-specific knowledge are a matter of degree, I will talk about them 
																																																								
7 For earlier discussions of application specific know-how, see Winter (1987) and Breschi and Malerba (1997) 
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as discrete choices for convenience.   
 
At first glance, it might seem that firms would only ever want to invest in highly 
application-specific capabilities. After all, the literature on capabilities has long argued that only 
idiosyncratic capabilities can underlie a competitive advantage. But this thinking ignores the fact 
that general-purpose capabilities provide a necessary foundation for application-specific 
capabilities. Consider the use of genomics to identify promising drugs to treat cancer. Advantage 
comes from unique capabilities to apply genomics (along with other bodies of scientific 
knowledge) to identify cancer drugs. But, this also requires mastering quite a bit of knowledge 
about genomics, which is potentially applicable in to a broad range of therapeutic areas, as well 
as for developing products in agriculture, specialty chemicals, and energy. While it may not be 
sufficient for advantage, general-purpose know-how is necessary.   
 
General-purpose know-how is also strategically important because it shapes a firm’s 
future potential market entry options. Investments in a given body of general-purpose know-how 
delineate a set of options for future investments in application-specific know-how.  For instance, a 
drug company’s investments in genomics (general purpose) create a set of future options for 
application-specific investments in a variety of therapeutic areas (cancer, diabetes, etc.).  
Google’s general-purpose know-how in computer science and information technology has 
created options for it to make application-specific investments in driverless vehicles. Because 
general-purpose know-how is (by definition) more transferable across contexts and markets, it 
provides the firm future strategic growth options.  Investments in highly application-specific know-
how also involve a trade-off. They may deepen the firm’s advantage in a specific market, but 
because of their inherent non-transferability, they may also constrain the firm’s future market 
entry strategies. Choices about capabilities—which existing ones to deepen and which new ones 
to attempt to create—have consequence for market entry strategies.   
 
Deepening vs. Broadening 
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As discussed earlier, capability formation results from various kinds of activities, including 
formal R&D projects, technology adoption, investments in physical and human capital, 
experimentation, business process redesign, and autonomous learning by doing. For 
convenience, I will refer to these types of capability creating activities as “investments”.  
Investments can be aimed at deepening the firm’s existing capabilities or at broadening the firm’s 
repertoire into capabilities. Both general-purpose and application specific know-how can be 
subjected to deepening or broadening investments. Figure 1 below illustrates the choice space 
















New Domain Know-How 
Fortified Domain Know-How 
New Applications Know-How
Fortified Applications Know-How
Honda building capabilities in light 
jet design 
Google building capabilities in auto 
design 
Honda’s research in nano-science 
 
Google’s investments in biology and 
genomics
Honda’s investments in vehicle 
design simulation methods 
Google’s R&D on internet search
Honda training workers on 
quality improvement methods 
Google’s research on advanced 
computer science 
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the examples above were also designed to illustrate). It should also be clear that certain 
strategies might require investments in specific combinations of new capabilities. For instance, as 
Google pursues a strategy to enter markets like vehicles and health care, it must both broaden its 
general-purpose know-how (e.g. hardware and mechanical design for cars, medical science for 
health care) as well as its application-specific know-how (e.g. vehicle design, diagnosis of mental 
health problems, etc.). A firm’s allocation of investments across different types of capabilities 




V. Connecting a Firm’s Capability Strategy to Product Market Competition 
In practice, different firms likely pursue very different capability strategies. Some may 
focus heavily on deepening application-specific know-how, while others may be putting more 
resources into broadening both general purpose and applications know-how.  As is the case for 
all strategy decisions, there is no “one best way”, but a series of trade-offs that need to be 
evaluated against competitive conditions. As mentioned earlier, a robust capability-based theory 
of strategy should connect firms’ capability investment choices with product market competition.   
 
To simplify matters, let’s consider three fairly broad contexts: 1) Stable Competition 
whereby a firm competes against existing incumbent rivals in an existing market (e.g. Apple vs. 
Samsung in mobile computing devices; Ford vs. GM in automobiles; Airbus vs. Boeing in large 
aircraft.  2) Schumpeterian Entry whereby an incumbent firm faces the threat (or reality) of entry 
from new rivals armed with new capabilities (incumbent automobile companies vs. Tesla in 
automobiles; watch companies vs. Apple in wearable computing devices, newspapers vs. Google 
in advertising).  3) Penrosian Dynamics whereby an existing firms seeks to enter a new market 
that requires the creation of at least some new capabilities (Amazon’s entry in Web Services; 
Netflix’s entry into entertainment content creation, Virgin Group’s entry into businesses as diverse 
as airlines, trains, mobile telephony, radio, broad band internet, fitness, health care, insurance, 
	 22
banking, space travel, etc.). I choose these three competitive circumstances strictly for illustrative 
purposes rather than to argue that they constitute the entire universe of competitive situations. 
They do not.  They are different enough from one another, however, to begin to see how 
competitive context may be expected to influence capability strategies. 
 
1. Stable Competition 
It is popular today to talk about how competition has become highly turbulent and subject 
to sweeping forces of “disruption” and “hyper-competition.” In reality, many industries are 
characterized by relatively stable competition between a reasonably limited set of long-standing 
rivals who compete against one another in well-defined product market spaces. These would 
include such stable oligopolies as the airframe industry, the jet engine industry, the auto industry 
(until very recently), microprocessors, banking, insurance, food processing, agriculture, 
petroleum, tires and chemicals. Stable product market structures, however, do not necessarily 
imply static capability strategies. Contrary to the view often expressed in the dynamic capabilities 
literature (starting with Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997), the creation of new capabilities is not 
limited strictly to “highly dynamic” product markets. Beneath the seemingly placid surface of 
product market competition, firms may be investing heavily in the creation of new technological, 
operational or distributional capabilities in order to gain advantage. Capability creation and 
renewal is just as important in stable competitive contexts as they are in more turbulent ones.   
 
Consider the auto industry. In many ways, it is the perfect picture of a (mature) stable 
competitive context. The top ten producers account for 81% of global sales; and, among the top 
ten, eight have very long histories in the business (VW, Toyota, GM, Renault-Nissan, Ford, 
Honda, Peugot, Fiat-Chrysler). The top three players (VW, Toyota, and GM) account for over a 
third of the global market. Market shares certainly evolve over time, but changes of greater than 
1% in a year are the exception, not the norm.    
 
Yet, the auto industry is far from static in terms of capability creation.  Auto companies 
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are among the largest R&D spenders in the world. In 2014, Volkswagen invested $13.5 billion in 
R&D, more than any other company in the world (for comparison, that is about 65% more than 
Google spent). Six automobile companies (VW, Toyota, GM, Ford, Daimler, and Honda) rank 
among the top 20 R&D spenders worldwide in 2014. Auto companies have competed intensely to 
create new technological and manufacturing capabilities (Fujimoto 1999). The time it takes to 
develop a vehicle has been cut in half over the past two decades by creating new organizational 
capabilities (via changes in development process, project team structures, etc.) and new 
technological capabilities (e.g. computer aided design and virtual prototyping via computer 
simulation). Manufacturing capabilities as well have been transformed by changes in organization 
(e.g. work force management, supplier management) and technology (e.g. automation). While 
many of these capabilities are not the kind of “disruptive” innovations that garner a lot of attention, 
they none-the-less shape competitive outcomes in the industry (Fujimoto 1999). GM and Toyota 
are similar companies. They are among the largest in the industry; both have long histories; both 
offer comparably broad product lines and sell in essentially the same global markets. Their 
product market strategies are similar. Yet, they have experienced very different competitive 
fortunes. This can largely be explained by differences in product development capabilities that 
influence development lead times, engineering productivity, design quality (Clark and Fujimoto 
1990, Fujimoto 1999), and manufacturing capabilities that shape product costs and quality 
(Womack et al. 1990).  
 
The microprocessor business is a similar case where intense capability competition 
occurs amidst a relatively stable product market. The microprocessor market has been about as 
stable an oligopoly (near monopoly) as there is. Intel has maintained a near iron grip on the 
market for more than three decades, with market share ranging between approximately 80% and 
98.5% (the rest being captured largely by AMD). Innovation has been very rapid, yet largely 
evolutionary (extensions of the Intel X86 architecture). Yet, from a capability creation point of 
view, this is a highly dynamic industry. Intel is the world’s third largest spender on R&D ($10.6 
billion in 2014) and one of the world’s largest investors in new plant and capital equipment ($11 
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billion in 2014). It has incessantly pushed the leading edge of both microprocessor design and 
semiconductor manufacturing processes to create ever more powerful and functional devices (the 
most recent example of which is a three dimensional chip fabrication technique known as 
FinFET). Certainly, Intel’s dominance is due to a variety of strategic actions (Pisano 2001, Yoffie 
and Sind 2005), but it would be hard to dismiss the fact that Intel has done a far better job than 
AMD in creating the design and manufacturing capabilities that matter most in the microprocessor 
market.   
 
The auto and microprocessor cases are great reminders that capability creation and 
renewal matter even in markets not undergoing competitive upheaval. No, these are not “radical” 
or “disruptive” innovation contexts where core product concepts are fundamentally changing 
(although as discussed later, the auto context may be on the verge of changing). Much of the 
innovation in automobiles and in microprocessors has been routine. It builds upon and extends 
existing product and process concepts. Because of its focus on “adaptability,” the current 
dynamic capabilities literature would dismiss these contexts as uninteresting (in fact, it is likely 
that firms like Intel or Toyota would not even qualify as having the illusive “dynamic capabilities” 
because they have yet to prove they can adapt to radical change). But routine innovation does 
not mean the underlying capabilities for product development and manufacturing (or other parts 
of the business) are static. They are not. Capabilities are created and renewed even where 
product market competition is relatively stable.   
 
 One common characteristic of stable product markets is that competition tends to center 
around a few long-standing attributes (in microprocessors, the name of the game is processing 
speed; in aircraft, competition revolves around “costs per seat mile”). As a result, capability 
creation tends to occur along fairly well-defined trajectories that drive those key competitive 
attributes (Dosi 1982). In microprocessors, for instance, processing speed is driven largely by 
density and greater density depends on ever-smaller line widths. Advantage stems from 
understanding how customers’ needs for specific products are evolving and the potential 
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technical solutions that may fill the gap between expected and actual product performance. This 
requires deep and nuanced understanding of the specific product technologies, the specific 
market and the target customer segments and how customers use the product. I would 
conjecture that deepening application-specific know-how would be the predominant capability 
strategy in stable product market contexts.   
 
One defining characteristic of stable product markets is that, in the absence of some 
shock (which we discuss in the section below on Schumpeterian dynamics), market leaders tend 
to remain leaders (and laggards stay laggards, see e.g. Gort 1963, Porter and Caves 1978, 
Chandler 1990, Sutton 2007). We also have some scattered evidence of capability persistence 
from a few industry case studies  (e.g. Chandler 1990; for semiconductors, see Dosi 1985 and 
Malera 1986; for automobiles see Womack et al. 1990 and Fujimoto 1999). While much more 
empirical research is required to establish the link between market leadership and capability 
leadership in stable markets, let us assume for now the stylized fact of persistent capability 
leaders. Persistent capability leadership is a puzzle. Why do laggards have a hard time “catching 
up”? Capability competition focused on application-specific know-how provides a possible 
explanation. In general, application-specific know-how builds cumulatively, involves learning-by-
doing, revolves around tacit knowledge, and is difficult to imitate (Winter 1987, Breschi and 
Malerba 1997). Together, these characteristics go a long way toward explaining a persistence of 
capability leadership.  An interesting topic for future research is whether capability strategies 
focused on application-specific knowledge are the cause or the result of a stable competitive 
context.   
 
 2. Schumpeterian Entry 
Stable industries discussed above are not inherently stable forever. Technological and 
business model innovation (often from new entrants) can create potentially destabilizing changes 
in competitive positions. The why established firms fail literature goes back to Schumpeter, of 
course, but saw a resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s with a number of seminal contributions 
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elaborating on the underlying causes of Schumpeterian creative destruction (e.g. Tushman and 
Anderson 1985, Henderson and Clark 1990, Suarez and Utterback 1995, Christensen 1997). 
Unlike the case for stable competition above, Schumpeterian competition has drawn a number of 
in-depth industry case studies that explore the rich details by which specific technologies have 
evolved, and the challenges of specific organizations in responding (in addition to the seminal 
pieces cited above, see also Klepper 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000; King and Tucci 2002; 
Bresnahan, Greenstein, and Henderson 2011; and O’Reilly and Tushman 2008).  
 
The consensus from the literature is that, as predicted by Schumpeter, dramatic changes 
in either the technological or market environment put incumbents at high risk of failure (but as 
pointed out by O’Reilly and Tushman (2008), failure is not a foregone conclusion and some firms 
seem to have the capacity to adapt—what they call a dynamic capability). The more controversial 
question is why?  Different literatures have posited different underlying causal mechanisms of 
failure.  
 
The why successful firms fail literature raises, but does not fully answer, the question, 
how much do capabilities matter for firm survival in the face of Schumpeterian competition. Two 
theories—“disruptive innovation” (Christensen 1997) and “economies of scope” (Bresnahan et al. 
2011)—imply that a firm’s capabilities are relatively fungible, and that capability constraints play, 
at best, a second order role. That is, firms have the capacity to develop novel capabilities in 
response to Schumpeterian competitive threats but they fail to engage this capacity either 
because they are myopic (Christensen 1997) or because they are responding (rationally) to the 
real costs of redeploying common assets (Bresnahan et al. 2011). This stands in contrast to work 
on competence-destroying innovation (Tushman and Anderson 1985, Henderson and Clark 1990, 
Leonard-Barton 1992) that paints a far more constrained view of the ability of firms’ to create the 
needed new capabilities to fend off entrants.   
 
The distinction between general-purpose knowledge and application-specific knowledge 
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may help provide some predictable hypotheses to resolve this question. Typical Schumpeterian 
shocks involve new entrants armed with some novel general-purpose capability pitted against 
incumbents armed with deep application specific know-how. Consider the increasingly less 
hypothetical situation of Google entering the car industry (either directly or via alliance) with some 
type of autonomous vehicle. Google would be a classic Schumpeterian entrant in that its general-
purpose capabilities in information technology, data science, digital design, and communications 
have not been historically part of the repertoire of automobile companies. Automobile companies 
know a lot about developing and manufacturing cars (application specific know-how) and have a 
number of fairly deep general-purpose capabilities in traditional “auto” fields (e.g. mechanical 
engineering, industrial design, high volume manufacturing, etc.). What they lack (to date) are the 
same general-purpose capabilities in information technology, data science, digital design and 
communications possessed by Google. Of course, what Google lacks (to date) are detailed 
capabilities in vehicle design and manufacturing accumulated by auto companies over decades, 
as well as some of the general purpose capabilities that underlie those (e.g. mechanical engineer, 
etc.). If you wanted to predict whether Google will “disrupt” the auto industry, you have to ask the 
question: will it be easier (faster) for Google to acquire the general purpose and application-
specific capabilities in vehicles they lack or for automobile companies to acquire the general 
purpose capabilities in information technology they lack? Of course, major changes in underlying 
technology can also make obsolete some application-specific know-how that may have once 
been a barrier to entry (e.g. autonomous vehicles require a lot less attention to driver interface 
design and aesthetic aspects of “driveability” such as sporty handling). Schumpeterian entrants 
succeed when they are able to acquire the required application-specific know-how faster than 
incumbents can acquire the Schumpeterian entrants’ novel general-purpose know-how (or when 
they can make that application-specific know-how obsolete).   
 
Much of the research on Schumpeterian competition has focused on the challenges 
faced by incumbents in responding to new entrants. The framework above suggests that a key 
element of this challenge for incumbents concerns the development of new general-purpose 
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know-how.  And it raises a question for future research: are the organizational capabilities 
required for deepening application-specific know-how different from those required to broaden 
general purpose know-how? Again, consider the auto industry as an illustrative example. Even if 
incumbent auto companies recognize a potential threat from new entrants like Apple or Google,  
do they have the organizational capabilities to broaden their general purpose know-how (into say 
information technology and data science), after decades of focusing on deepening application-
specific know-how (getting better at designing and manufacturing cars)? Current research has 
offered little empirical insight into these types of questions. While the literature focuses on the 
challenges of incumbents in Schumpeterian upheaval, this framework also sheds light on the 
potential challenges of new entrants. Specifically, it highlights the role of application-specific 
knowledge as a potential barrier to entry. More empirical work examining the challenges of 
broadening general-purpose knowledge (faced by incumbents) and broadening application 
specific knowledge (faced by new entrants) would provide a much better understanding of 
Schumpeterian dynamics.   
 
3. Penrosian Dynamics 
As Edith Penrose first pointed out in 1959, a common strategy for firm growth is to 
expand into new lines of business by utilizing common fixed resources. The Penrosian growth 
theory starts with the premise that firms make investments in a set of resources (like brand, 
distribution, technology, etc.) to serve their initial market. When these resources entail high fixed 
costs and cannot be fully utilized in the initial market, profitable opportunities exist for firms to use 
them in new markets. A number of scholars extended her core theories to develop robust 
explanations of the multi-product firm (Teece 1982) and to explain why diversification into 
“related” lines of business tended to be more profitable than “unrelated” diversification 
(Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1984, Teece et al. 1994). The core theoretical elements of 
Penrosian growth process are economies of scale (which lead to assets being under-utilized in 
“core” markets), economies of scope (which enable assets to be deployed into new markets with 
low marginal cost) and transaction cost economics (which make it more profitable for a firm to 
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capture rents on these assets via internal diversification than through licensing). Overall, a 
resource-based perspective provides a relatively coherent picture of growth through 
diversification. 
 
There is a puzzle, however, that cannot be explained by a pure resource-based 
perspective. Diversification is almost never purely a process of exploiting existing assets; it 
usually requires the creation of some combination of new general-purpose know-how and new 
application-specific know-how. Consider the example of Virgin Group (for details, see Pisano and 
Corsi 2012), which diversified into a broad range of businesses, including music, airlines, trains, 
radio, broadband communication, fitness centers, insurance and banking, gaming and, most 
recently, primary care physician practices. From a resource-based perspective, this is a simple 
story of Virgin leveraging its powerful brand that has come to stand for excellent (and 
entertaining) customer service.8  But, operationally, these businesses are very different.  The 
capabilities to run an airline are completely different than those required to operate a bank or a 
fitness center. While Virgin outsources a lot of “back-end” operations and infrastructure to third 
parties, its operating companies still need to create capabilities that do not appear to be part of 
the existing Virgin repertoire. Or consider the recent entry of Honda into the light private market.  
Broadly speaking, jets and cars (and motorcycles and lawn and garden equipment) both utilize 
similar general-purpose capabilities in mechanical engineering and (increasingly) electronic 
engineering. However, to describe Honda’s diversification strategy as leveraging “core 
competences” in mechanical engineering would be to completely ignore the high degree of 
specialized design capability required in each of these segments. An airplane is not a car with 
wings. The move into light jets almost certainly required Honda to invest in and learn new 
application-specific capabilities idiosyncratic to aircraft.   
 
Teece et al. (1994) attempt to explain the patterns of diversification of firms within a 
																																																								
8 With the exception of primary practices in the UK, Virgin always uses the Virgin brand in its new businesses (Virgin 
Atlantic, Virgin Active, Virgin Casino, Virgin Mobile, Virgin Money, etc.). 
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Penrosian framework. Empirically, they found patterns in firms’ diversification moves that 
suggested a degree of “coherence”; theoretically, they argue that these patterns can be explained 
by such factors as technological opportunity, learning, path-dependence, and selection. While 
they propose that coherence results from the incremental, cumulative (path dependent) nature of 
firm learning, they do not elaborate on what drives the range options. For instance, they 
hypothesize (page 17), “If firms attempt to enter new markets with new technologies, failure is 
likely to be the norm because the effort is likely to be outside the firm’s learning range (italics 
added).”  What the learning range is for any given firm, however, is not specified. How broad or 
narrow is this “learning range”? Is the learning range more constrained by general-purpose know-
how (say learning medical science if your expertise is in computer science) or application-specific 
know-how (learning how to design jets if your expertise is in cars). Is the “learning range” a 
function of the firm’s experience with past capability broadening moves?  
 
Predicting the success of these capability-broadening strategies is challenging. The 
problem is that we lack good theories to help managers predict how far they can broaden the 
application-specific and general-purpose capabilities of the firm in order to serve new product or 
geographic markets. Outside the extremes of either trivial leveraging (Honda developing a next 
generation car) or heroic leaps (Honda developing a cancer drug), we have no real basis to 
distinguish the vast intermediate space (Honda developing a lightweight jet). Yet it is exactly in 
this middle ground where companies’ most important strategic capability decisions must be 
made. Finding insights into the true limits of firms’ capability broadening moves should be a focal 
point for future research.    
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Everyday, in enterprises throughout the world, managers make decisions about 
investments and other interventions that influence their firm’s capabilities. These decisions, in 
turn, have consequences for competitive advantage.  As such, they are central to the study and 
practice of competitive strategy.  This was a central tenet of the “dynamic capabilities” framework 
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when first proposed two decades ago. Strategy is a normative field, and thus strategy theories 
must ultimately be judged by how well they inform practice.  From this perspective, the dynamic 
capabilities research program to date has not delivered despite intensive effort by many talented 
scholars.  The dynamic capabilities literature has become mired in endless debates about 
definitions (which has lead to introduction of even more terminology).  At the same time, it has 
failed to address the most important questions of practice a theory of strategy must ask. The 
existing dynamic capabilities literature, by focusing heavily on firms’ generalized capacity for 
adaptation to change, does not provide much insight about strategic choices. Certainly, a firm 
with a greater capacity for change will have more strategic options than one that is more inert.  
Such flexibility is no doubt a good thing for an organization.  Research that helps us understand 
organizational flexibility is certainly worthwhile. However, understanding what makes an 
organization flexible is different from understanding what makes it competitive.  The latter is the 
strategic problem faced by practitioners.  The gap been the problems of management practice 
and the focal problems of  the dynamic capabilities literature is striking.  
In this essay, I have tried to sketch the outlines of a possible path forward to address this 
gap.  I started with the premise that firms compete at two levels: they compete in product markets 
and they compete in the creation of capabilities that provide them advantage in those markets.  
These two levels are linked. Competitive conditions impact capability choices and capability 
choice shape competitive conditions.   While we know quite a bit about competition in product 
markets (thanks to decades of research in industrial organization and strategic management), we 
still know relatively little about how firms should think of competing in the creation of capabilities.  
This paper has argued that a firm’s capability strategy can be defined as its pattern of investment 
in different types of capabilities. The paper offered a simple typology of capabilities based on two 
dimensions.  One dimension is the degree to which investments are made in general-purpose 
versus application-specific know-how. The second dimensions concerns whether the investment 
is focused on deepening the firm’s existing capabilities or on broadening its repertoire to 
encompass new capabilities.  
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Strategic choices, by definition, involve trade-offs.  By focusing on the distinction between 
general-purpose and application-specific investments, the framework here brings trade-offs to the 
issue of capability selection.  There is no type of capability that is inherent superior to another.  
Each choice along the spectrum of general purpose to application specific brings a different set of 
trade-offs.   Investments in general purpose know-how creates future investment options in 
application-specific know-how. These, in turn, provide the firm future growth options (via 
Penrosian diversification strategy) or provide the firm the potential to respond to Schumpeterian 
entry threats.  But there is a cost:  general purpose-know by itself does not convey strategic 
advantage in product markets. Application-specific know-how is required.  In contrast, deepening 
application-specific know-how can bolster competitive position in an existing market, but at the 
cost of restricting future growth options.  
One conjecture arising from this framework is that the value of different kinds of 
capabilities (and thus different kinds of capability strategies) is contingent on the nature of 
competition faced by the firm.  Contrary to the existing literature, I have argued that even in 
markets characterized by relatively stable competition, capability competition can be intense.  But 
my conjecture was that in this type of competitive situation, capability competition revolves 
around deepening application-specific know-how.  Where application-specific know-how is highly 
cumulative and highly appropriable, we would expect the persistence of capability leadership. In 
markets undergoing some type of Schumpeterian “shock”, the nature of capability competition 
shifts toward broadening of both general purpose and application-specific know-how. The 
framework presented here gives us a way to think about the potential outcome of a 
Schumpeterian shock (not all of them lead to the downfall of incumbents). The outcome of a 
Schumpeterian shock may depend on the extent to which incumbents’ existing application-
specific know-how advantage over new entrants is preserved or made obsolete by changes in 
general-purpose knowledge.  Where application-specific know-how is preserved, incumbents 
likely have higher chances of survival. The framework also gives us a way to think about the likely 
success of Penrosian diversifications strategies.  The typical Penrosian growth story is one of 
leveraging capabilities and resources across “related” markets. However, entry into any new 
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market (even the most “related”) requires a firm to develop new application-specific know-how. 
The success of a Penrosian diversification strategy depends on the firm’s ability to broaden its 
application-specific know-how and on the inherent difficulty of acquiring or emulating such know-
how.  Where learning application-specific know-how is difficult (say because it is highly tacit or 
highly proprietary), Penrosian growth strategies are likely to fail.  
The framework developed in this paper is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, 
other research on dynamic capabilities.  It recognizes that firm’s choices are partially constrained 
by past decisions (but, to emphasize, firms are not complete prisoners of their past choices 
either—they have discretion).  It is also not inconsistent with the possibility that some firms may 
have greater ability to expand and reconfigure their capabilities. That is, some firms may be more 
adaptable (or have greater “dynamic capability” to use the language of the extant literature). The 
differences are ones of focus.  The framework developed in this paper emphasizes choices of 
capability investments, rather than adaptability, and tries to provide some helpful way to think 
about the consequences of those choices.   
My major goal in this essay has been to identify important gaps in our theoretical and 
empirical knowledge as a means to focus future research in productive directions.  Let me close 
by highlighting a few of these.   First, a major empirical gap concerns the typical patterns of 
investments by firms in different capability enhancing efforts.  We simply do not know, for 
instance, how much firms in different industries tend to devote to deepening or broadening their 
general-purpose and application-specific know-how, and how successful these investments tend 
to be.  This would be a good starting point to assess whether certain kinds of capability strategies 
are associated with different kinds of product market strategies and competitive situations. 
Similarly, we have little insight about the challenges firms face in developing new application-
specific know-how Is it easier in some contexts that others?  When is such application-specific 
know-how relatively easy to imitate or acquire?  In contrast, when is it a potent barrier to entry?   I 
offered some conjectures in this paper as a way to motivate discussion, but empirical work on the 
topic is sorely needed.   
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A second big gap in theoretical and empirical knowledge concerns judgments about the 
range of capabilities any given firm can pursue over some specific time period. For both 
Schumpeterian entry and Penrosian dynamic contexts, competition involves races to create new 
application-specific and new general-purpose know-how.  As of now, we have no real way to 
predict theoretically how such competitions will pan out.  We do not know which broadening 
moves are likely to succeed and which ones will fail (beyond the obvious extremes). I have 
argued that a strategic theory of capabilities needs to focus on the “middle ground” of capabilities 
that are neither trivial for the firm to create in the short-term nor impossible to create over the 
long-term. But this “middle ground” is broad, and much more empirical research needs to be done 
to help identify systematic factors that shape which capability expansions are economically 
feasible and which ones are not.  Without such insight, we do not have the basis for a normative 
theory that can guide practice.   
A third gap ripe for research concerns what is required for a firm to alter its capability 
strategy. For instance, if a firm has focused for the past several decades on application-
deepening investments, how difficult is it to shift course to a strategy focused more on broadening 
application-specific know-how or general-purpose know-how? Are there high-level organizational 
routines (like governance structures, resource allocation processes, etc.) that influence which 
capability strategies are open to the firm at any given time? We simply have no data on this 
subject to even speculate.  
 Addressing the above gaps will require in-depth longitudinal investigations of the 
evolution of specific technological and operating processes within firms and industries. We will 
need to examine the allocation of investment resources across different kinds of capabilities and 
the consequences of those decisions for operating performance. We will need to understand a lot 
more about the details of capability creating projects, and why some work and some fail.  These 
kinds of data are typically not found in public sources, but require researchers to go into the field 
and inside organizations to capture primary quantitative and qualitative data.  While such studies 
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have fallen out of favor in academia in the recent past, they will be absolutely essential if we are 
to make significant progress on a topic of enormous importance to the practice of management.    
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